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RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM AS A FELONY: 
ANTITRUST AND THE PRISONER'S 
DILEMMAt 
John Shepard Wiley Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The idea of cooperation sounds heartening. Cooperation is the 
milk of human kindness, the Good Samaritan, and "hope for the fu-
ture of our species."1 The lawyers who practice and write in the field 
of antitrust, however, take a different view. For them, cooperation is a 
crime.2 
This essay is about the idea of cooperation in antitrust law. At the 
outset, ·I clarify my terminology. Biologists often refer to reciprocal 
altruism. 3 "Reciprocal altruism" in the antitrust context has an odd 
semantic ring. There is nothing altruistic or self-sacrificing about the 
cooperation that antitrust rules outlaw: cartel price fixing. Firms do 
it strictly for the money. I prefer the term reciprocity to describe a 
firm's strategy to pursue behavior that will profit it only if competing 
firms engage in similar behavior. This usage can create confusion in 
t © John Shepard Wiley Jr. 1988. 
• Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Jonathan Bendor, Robert Boyd, Jack 
Hirshleifer, Richard Posner, Mark Ramseyer, and Eric Rasmusen for helpful comments. Errors 
are my responsibility. 
1. R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (comments of Lewis Thomas on 
book jacket). It is no accident that a leading scholarly journal in the field is titled the Journal of 
Conflict Resolution. 
2. See also Lowenstein, For God, far Country, or for Me? (Book Review), 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
1479 (1986). He states: 
Bribes, whatever else they may be, are a form of mutually beneficial exchange, or reciproc· 
ity. Reciprocity is normally desirable, a cornerstone of human relations in economic, social, 
political, and personal matters .... Having a concept of bribery, then, means identifying as 
immoral or criminal a subset of transactions and relationships within a set that, generally 
speaking, is fundamentally beneficial to mankind, both functionally and intrinsically. 
Id. at 1480-81. Cf. D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 101 (1957) ("[I]n some 
contexts, if the two players are frustrated [in their attempt to cooperate], it may be beneficial to 
society."). 
3. Biologists are intensely interested in the scientific basis for this praised virtue. I presented 
a version of this paper at a UCLA-sponsored workshop on reciprocal altruism. Most of the 
workshop participants were behavioral biologists, interested in the problems of altruism in an 
evolutionary setting. The papers presented at the workshop, including a version of this Article, 
appear in 9 ETHOLOGY AND SocIOBIOLOGY 241 (1988). 
"Reciprocal altruism" also seems inapt in the biological context; biologists themselves seem 
to refer to the term without any necessary invocation of the common-sense implication of 
benevolence. 
1906 
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the present context, however, because reciprocity is also an antitrust 
term of art that refers to one firm's decision to sell to another only if 
the second agrees in turn to buy from the first.4 In this Article I use 
reciprocity in the former sense rather than in its latter, antitrust sense. 
Antitrust is a well established field, as American law goes. It has 
been an active one since 1890, when Congress passed the landmark 
Sherman Act, 5 a delphic congressional pronouncement whose brevity 
forced judges to take the lead in formulating specific antitrust policy. 
Some of the earliest Sherman Act decisions clarified that the Act's ban 
on contracts in restraint of trade included cartel agreements. 6 Just as 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq cqntinually strive to overcome their dif-
ferences in pursuit of high OPEC oil prices, so did Adam Smith say 
business people too seldom gather, even for merriment and diversion, 
without their talk soon turning to some contrivance or conspiracy 
against the public. 7 In market economies founded on competition 
among economic producers, producer cooperation in raising price (or 
restricting output) hurts consumers. Judges thus have interpreted the 
Sherman Act to contain a "per se" rule against price fixing agree-
ments: if two or more competitors meet and expressly agree to sell 
their product only above some specified price, antitrust law metes out 
harsh penalties. 8 Antitrust thereby aims to root out and destroy this 
simple and undesirable type of producer reciprocity. 
Antitrust judges have attacked producer cooperation beyond flatly 
outlawing express cartel agreements. For fear that competitors will 
tacitly cooperate, antitrust law has outlawed activity that has both a 
potential for social benefit and that does not involve express carteliza-
tion - but that might increase the chance of successful reciprocity.9 
The judges who have authored this law plainly believe that firms 
might engage in reciprocal altruism (or "tacit collusion" or "conscious 
parallelism"), and that that risk to competition is great enough to jus-
tify prophylactic losses in business efficiency. But their views stem 
solely from casual intuitions about the likelihood that reciprocal or 
tacitly "collusive" arrangements in fact will succeed in supplanting 
competition. 
In the last twenty years, however, skeptical commentators have 
4. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commn. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). 
5. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(1982)). 
6. E.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd., 115 U.S. 
211 (1899). 
7. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1796). 
8. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
9. E.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
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attacked the law these judges have made. 10 Essentially atheoretical 
legal doctrine thus has proved vulnerable to shifting attitudes of a fun-
damentally political nature. Recent game theory research, most 
prominently by Robert Axelrod, offers the hope of filling this theoreti-
cal void and providing antitrust doctrine with a more stable founda-
tion.11 Yet Axelrod's work, while of great potential interest to the 
antitrust world, contains limitations that block any direct transfer of 
his results to the Sherman Act. These limitations suggest an agenda 
for future game theory research and its application to antitrust 
doctrine. 
II. Two SCHOOLS OF ANTITRUST THOUGHT: FAITH AND 
SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
Antitrust law makes crucial -. and vulnerable - assumptions 
about the likelihood of reciprocity that causes harmful consequences 
to consumers. In this section, I first describe antitrust doctrines that 
demonstrate robust faith that firms indeed will tacitly cooperate to re-
duce pricing rivalry. I focus on two different antitrust doctrines that 
embody assumptions about the likelihood and harms of reciprocity: 
the law governing data exchanges among competitors, and the law 
governing mergers. Then I will recount the extent to which recent 
criticism of those doctrines has caused a revision in antitrust policy. 
This brief survey demonstrates that antitrust law inevitably incorpo-
rates some theory about reciprocity, but that no such theory has had a 
very strong or enduring intellectual foundation. 
A. Data Exchanges 
Competing firms can wish to communicate with one another to 
discover current market prices and conditions. Often these industry 
communications take place within a trade association. Since the early 
days of antitrust enforcement, "trustbusters" have viewed the activi-
ties of trade associations with suspicion: suspicion of reciprocity. In 
light of later game theory scholarship, the strength of - and lack of 
support for - this suspicion has been remarkable. 
A landmark decision, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 12 illustrates this point. The case concerned hardwood lumber 
mills that participated in the "Open Competition Plan" of the Ameri-
can Hardwood Manufacturers' Association (AHMA). The associa-
10. See notes 32-41 infra and accompanying text. 
11. See Part III.C infra and note 65 infra. 
12. 257 U.S. 377 (1921). 
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tion developed a plan that required mills to submit to it daily reports 
of sales quantities, prices, and customer identities, as well as monthly 
reports of production and stocks. The association then provided mem-
bers with weekly reports of industry sales and shipments, and monthly 
reports of production, inventory, prices, and market conditions. The 
association also inspected members' stocks and grading practices and 
held periodic meetings to discuss past and future production. 
These practices might have facilitated collusive pricing, especially 
because there was an indication that industry officials sometimes used 
meetings to harangue firms about the need to restrain their output. In 
particular, the chairman at one such meeting said, "If there is no in-
crease in production, particularly in oak, there is going to be good 
business. No man is safe in increasing his production. If he does, he 
will be in bad shape, as the demand won't come."13 But there was no 
direct evidence that the AHMA actually had promoted reciprocity, 
either by setting minimum prices or by punishing price cutters. The 
Court did claim that there was evidence that the AHMA's plan had 
"contributed greatly" to an increase in hardwood prices.14 Still, the 
Court did not isolate the cause of this price increase, and it is plain 
from the face of the opinion "that [the relevant year] was a year of 
high and increasing prices generally and that wet weather may have 
restricted [hardwood] production to some extent."15 Inflation, boom-
ing demand, and decreased supply thus might have accounted fully for 
the hardwood price increase, leaving no support for the Court's infer-
ence that the AHMA's action indeed had replaced price-competition 
with price-reciprocity. Instead, the Court's decision rested heavily 
upon a belief that dangerously successful reciprocity was highly 
probable. 
It was not costless for the Court to outlaw the private data dissemi-
nation at issue in the American Column case. All else being equal, 
uncertainty usually is economically undesirable. Firms' ability to plan 
and act efficiently is improved when uncertainty about present and 
future market conditions is reduced, a point that Justice Holmes' dis-
sent pressed forcefully. 16 The majority opinion did not try to argue 
that disseminating data about market conditions was a worthless ac-
tivity. Rather, the Court responded by stating a theory that reciproc-
13. 257 U.S. at 402 (emphasis omitted). 
14. 257 U.S. at 409. 
15. 257 U.S. at 409. 
16. 257 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I should have supposed that the Sherman Act 
did not set itself against knowledge . . . . I should have thought that the ideal of commerce was 
an intelligent interchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the 
future on both sides."). 
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ity inevitably posed a live threat to competition. The Court said this 
point was proved: 
by the disposition of men to follow their most intelligent competitors, 
especially when powerful; by the inherent disposition to make all the 
money possible, joined with the steady cultivation of the value of "har-
mony" of action; and by the system of reports, which makes the discov-
ery of price reductions inevitable and immediate. The sanctions of the 
plan obviously are, financial interest, intimate personal contact, and 
business honor, all operating under the restraint of exposure of what 
would be deemed bad faith and of trade punishment by powerful rivals. 
' 
. . . Men in general are so easily persuaded to do that which will 
obviously prove profitable that [the] reiterated opinion from the analyst 
of their association, with all obtainable data before him, that higher 
prices were justified and could easily be obtained, must, inevitably have 
resulted, as it did result, in concert of action in demanding them.17 
Particularly significant was the large number of firms involved in 
the case. The majority opinion mentioned - but did not stress - that 
some 365 firms participated in the "Open Competition Plan." 18 These 
firms, moreover, produced a total of only one-third of United States 
hardwood output. 19 The majority's empirical guess about reciprocity 
was thus that noncompetitive behavior was virtually inevitable under 
the circumstances, despite hundreds of participants within the AHMA 
and hundreds more outside it. The Court theorized that business 
firms in this situation would find it easy to collude on setting high 
prices. A similar attitude is evident in later data dissemination cases, 
although the number of participants involved was smaller.20 Antitrust 
law in these decisions has incorporated the suspicions of Adam 
Smith.21 
B. Merger Law 
Past merger doctrine also reveals a similar theory about reciproc-
ity. If trustbusters have been suspicious of the collusive implications 
of data exchanges, they have been downright fearful of the similar im-
plications of mergers. Unlike the Court in American Column, anti-
trust judges in merger cases generally have focused explicitly on the 
question of market share: the percentage of market sales or assets that 
each competitor controls. Merger law specifies under what conditions 
17. 257 U.S. at 399, 407 (quotations omitted and emphasis added). 
18. 257 U.S. at 391. 
19. 257 U.S. at 391. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). 
21. See text accompanying note 7 supra. 
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antitrust courts will permit two existing companies to unite into one 
larger unit. (Here I am concerned only with so-called "horizontal" 
mergers, or mergers between direct competitors. If we assume that 
soft drinks compete directly with each other, then Coke's attempted 
purchase of Dr. Pepper, and Pepsi's attempted purchase of 7-Up, are 
examples of attempted horizontal mergers.) Companies may merge 
for reasons as diverse as the managers who run them, but two explana-
tions typically predominate: first, mergers can yield efficiencies in pro-
duction that improve a company's competitive position and can benefit 
consumers; second, mergers can place independent competitors under 
a single control, thereby eliminating competition, creating market 
power, and enforcing producer cooperation. · 
On general principles, one might oppose large mergers because 
they increase economic concentration, which some hold to be intrinsi-
cally objectionable. With increased international competition, this 
view is not as popular in the 1980s as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, 
and this Article will pursue it no further. Instead, I will assume (in 
keeping with currently prevalent but certainly not indisputable views) 
that the objective in merger law is to permit those mergers that create 
efficiencies but to block those that create offsetting market power.22 
Thus conceived, merger law asks how many competitors must remain 
in a market to forestall harmful pricing reciprocity among them. 
Under this theory, mergers that leave at least this number should be 
legal, while those crossing this critical threshold should not. 
With the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act,23 
merger regulation in the United States gained teeth. In 1968, the De-
partment of Justice published Merger Guidelines24 setting forth quan-
titative levels that would trigger agency opposition to a proposed 
merger. As a self-conscious policy summary by an elite federal 
agency, these Guidelines were notable and influential. In general 
terms, the Department committed itself to oppose all mergers in which 
the two companies each had five percent or more of the market before 
the merger.25 This administrative guideline disclosed a belief that (if 
all firms are of equal size) pricing reciprocity - the implicit harm to 
be avoided - will occur if fewer than twenty market participants ex-
22. The fundamental article on this now highly elaborated approach is Williamson, Econo-
mies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 18 (1968). 
23. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 18, 21 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
24. U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1968, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~ 
13,101 (1988). 
25. Id. at p. 20,523. 
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ist, but is difficult to the point of impossibility when more firms occupy 
the market. 
The judicial merger decisions of the 1960s, when Chief Justice Earl 
Warren presided over the Supreme Court, reveal a similar but even 
stronger suspicion of reciprocity. In 1966, the Court invalidated a 
merger of the Von's Grocery and the Shopping Bag supermarket 
chains in Los Angeles.26 In 1958, two years before the merger, Von's 
operated twenty-seven stores in the area and Shopping Bag operated 
thirty-four.27 The largest chain accounted for but 8% of area grocery 
sales; Von's was third with 4.7%; and Shopping Bag was sixth with 
4.2%.28 The merged Von's/Shopping Bag company thus would have 
accounted for about 8 percent of a market in which there were over 
3000 single-store firms and over 100 chains of two or more stores.29 
As the dissent pungently noted, "Three thousand five hundred and 
ninety single-store firms is a lot of grocery stores."30 Nonetheless, the 
majority said that this merger's slight increase in firm size and reduc-
tion in the number of competitors was excessive.31 Once again, it is 
plain that antitrust decisionmakers believed that rivalry could easily 
evolve into cartelization. 
C. Reciprocity: Skepticism and Scorn 
Influential critics have attacked this antitrust policy, and in a sub-
tle but definite way they have succeeded in modifying it. Two signifi-
cant conclusions follow. First, the critics' subtle success shows the 
weakness of the foundation for earlier beliefs. Second, the critics' at-
tack has embodied a different theory of reciprocity, one more skeptical 
about the likelihood of successful cooperation. 
I cannot document change in the relevant antitrust doctrine by the 
usual and most positive method of citing later cases that overrule ear-
lier ones. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts of the 1970s and 1980s 
have decided neither directly relevant merger cases nor any data dis-
semination cases at all. Case law thus does not directly show changing 
attitudes about the likelihood of business pricing reciprocity. 
Notwithstanding this lack of direct evidence of change, it is quite 
unlikely that the Court would decide cases like Von's Grocery the same 
way today. Academic commentators, convinced of the hardiness of 
26. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
27. 384 U.S. at 272. 
28. 384 U.S. at 281 (White, J., concurring). 
29. 384 U.S. at 273. 
30. 384 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
31. 384 U.S. at 277. 
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competition and the fragility of cooperation, have fiercely criticized 
the Warren Court's strict treatment of mergers. Among the most 
prominent has been Robert Bork, President Reagan's rejected nomi-
nee to the Supreme Court. While a professor, Bork developed a theme 
of Stigler's to ridicule the Warren Court's merger doctrine.32 He in-
stead proposed that courts permit mergers "up to 60 or 70 percent of 
the market," a "guess" that he was willing to weaken "[p]artly as a 
tactical concession to current oligopoly phobia and partly in recogni-
tion of [a later statutory amendment's] intended function of tightening 
[earlier merger rules]."33 Bork's final recommendation therefore was 
to permit mergers up to a market share "that would allow for other 
mergers of similar size in the industry and still leave three significant 
companies. " 34 Elsewhere in his work, Bork describes his difficulty 
with 
the uncertainty of the premise that tacit collusion is an important phe-
nomenon, or even that it is a real phenomenon. . . . The difficulty of 
maintaining small-number cartels based upon detailed communication 
and agreement should ... make us dubious that concerted action with-
out explicit collusion is likely to be at all common or successful. 35 
Criticism like that by Professor Bork affected the merger policy of 
the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Under President Reagan, the 
Department of Justice revised the Department's 1968 Merger Guide-
lines. This revision, completed in 1984, adopted a complex quantita-
tive rule to specify when the Department now will attack or permit 
mergers.36 For simplicity of explanation, assume all firms within a 
market are the same size before a merger. In that situation the 1984 
Guidelines permit two firms to merge into one if a total of eleven com-
petitors remains afterwards - but not if a total of only ten remains. 37 
Recall that the 1968 Guidelines promised much stricter opposition to 
mergers, to the point of challenging mergers that left as many as 
nineteen firms. 3s By lowering the critical threshold from nineteen to 
ten, the 1984 revision showed a marked increase in official tolerance of 
market concentration - stemming from a marked increase in official 
skepticism about the likelihood of pricing reciprocity. The Supreme 
32. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST p ARADOX 178-224 (1978). See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 
72 J. POL. EcoN. 44 (1964). 
33. R. BORK, supra note 32, at 221. 
34. Id. at 222. 
35. Id. at 175. See also id. at 179-91. 
36. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,831 
(1984). 
37. Id. 
38. See text at notes 24-25 supra. I continue to analyze both Guidelines under the unlikely 
but simplifying assumption that all firms in the market are of equal size before the merger. 
1914 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1906 
Court has echoed a similar sentiment in recent dicta. 39 
Ill. MARKET COMPETITION AS THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
Critics like Bork attacked prevailing antitrust assumptions about 
reciprocity on essentially negative grounds. Older theory had sug-
gested that added market concentration enlarged the prospect of reci-
procity - without contributing much to those markets' productive 
efficiency. The critics savaged this conventional economic learning 
about oligopolies as vague, illogical, and essentially empty.40 The crit-
ics' case concentrated more on refuting the claims of the existing liter-
ature than on building affirmative, formal, and decisive theoretical 
support for the thesis that reciprocity indeed was unlikely. A typical 
style of reasoning, for instance, was that "[i]f explicit collusion is diffi-
cult to arrange and hard to enforce if arranged, tacit collusion must be 
next to impossible."41 
This scholarly attack of the 1960s and 1970s long has been familiar 
news to the legal antitrust community.42 The critics who authored 
this attack worked largely independently of contemporaneous game 
theory research that strongly supported their skepticism about market 
reciprocity. The research concerned the most extensively canvassed 
problem in game theory: the prisoner's dilemma. In this section, I 
first describe the prisoner's dilemma and connect its literature with the 
scholarly attack of the 1960s and 1970s. I do so not to assert the cor-
rectness of the critics' attack, but rather because later analysis of the 
prisoner's dilemma implies error in that attack. Game theory, while 
apparently supportive of the Bork critique, thus may prove ultimately 
most damaging of that critique. As I complete my survey of these 
most recent developments and evaluate their significance for antitrust 
policy, however, it becomes clear that we need research into three spe-
cific questions before this game theory can resolutely inform antitrust 
policy. 
39. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1521 (1988) 
("Cartels are neither easy to form nor easy to maintain."). 
40. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 32; J. McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRA• 
TION (1971); Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA• 
TION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); Demsetz, 
Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968). 
41. Y. BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 0 135 (1982). 
42. For example, a volume containing a number of key studies was co·edited by a leading 
antitrust law casebook author and is still published by a legal press. See INDUSTRIAL CONCEN· 
TRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974). 
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A. The Prisoner's Dilemma 
The prisoner's dilemma is a stock game theory problem43 named 
after the following fable. The police nab a pair suspected of a crime, 
separate them, and present each with the following proposition. If one 
confesses and supplies evidence that can convict the other who refuses 
to talk, the authorities will release the confessor and throw the book at 
the silent one. If both prisoners remain silent, the authorities have 
evidence to convict both only on minor charges. If both prisoners con-
fess, both are in big trouble. Without communicating, each prisoner 
must choose either to remain silent or to confess. 
A prisoner who remains silent "cooperates" with the partner. Ab-
breviate this prisoner's strategy as C. Convention correspondingly 
holds that one who confesses "defects" (abbreviated D), or "cheats," 
or, most colorfully, "finks." Because each prisoner has two options 
(play C or play D), a two-by-two matrix can display this game's four 
possible outcomes. Each of the matrix's four cells summarizes one 
outcome by listing pairs of numbers (or "payoffs," which here repre-
sent a bad rather than a good). The first number in the pair is the 
resulting jail time for the first player, ROW, and the second is the jail 
time for the second player, COLUMN.44 
43. Shubik attributes the prisoner's dilemma game to a 1950 Stanford University mimeo-
graph by A.W. Tucker. M. Sl:IUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 254 (1982). 
44. The values in this matrix are conventional but arbitrary. Generally and formally, a set of 
inequalities defines the prisoner's dilemma. Label the four possible payoffs with four letters: R 
(Reward); S (Sucker's payoll); T (Temptation); and P (Punishment). Define these payoffs as 
follows: 
COLUMN PLAYER 
cooperate defect 
p 
R L cooperate (R,R) (S,T) 
0 A 
w y 
E defect (f,S) (P,P) 
R 
Assume that the bigger the payoff the better. (Obviously the situation is reversed if numbers 
represent a bad, as in the jail time example in text.) The game is a prisoner's dilemma ifT > R 
> P > S. Most analysts add the condition that R > (I +S)/2, and some add that P > (I 
+S)/2. See, e.g., Boyd & Richerson, The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups, 132 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 337 (1988). 
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COLUMN PLAYER 
cooperate: defect: 
silence confess 
p 
R L cooperate: silence (1,1) (5,0) 
0 A 
w y 
E defect: confess (0,5) (3,3) 
R 
Parentheses: (jail time for ROW, jail time for COLUMN) 
The prisoner's dilemma is a generally interesting model for two 
reasons. First, it represents a common situation: the conflict that 
arises when individual actions benefit a group but are costly to 
individual members. Second, it leads to stark paradox. No matter 
what the partner does, each individual will do better by cheating. 
(Check this logic yourself on the matrix. First assume that your 
partner remains silent. Then assume your partner confesses. You will 
see that, in either event, you minimize your own jail time by 
confessing.) Even though the group of two prisoners would benefit if 
each prisoner cooperated by remaining silent, rational and informed 
self-interest leads both prisoners to their worst outcomes: each 
receives a heavy penalty for failing to cooperate with the other. This 
context for group cooperation thus frustrates individual aims, a result 
that occurs even if players repeatedly encounter the situation. 45 
B. Prisoner's Dilemma and Skepticism About Reciprocity 
The prisoner's dilemma is directly relevant to antitrust policy. 
Consider a market in which there exists only two producers - a "du-
opoly." For illustration, suppose the market again is for soft drinks, 
and that one firm inakes Coke (and Dr. Pepper) and the other makes 
Pepsi (and 7-Up). If consumers think soft drinks are pretty much the 
same and so buy mainly on the basis of price, then Coke and Pepsi 
each face the same problem: What price should I charge? 
The duopolists face a prisoner's dilemma - a fact that the anti-
trust literature has neglected but that game theorists and some econo-
mists have appreciated for at least thirty years.46 Both firms prefer the 
high price that a monopolist would select if a single firm controlled the 
entire soft drink market, yet each distrusts the other's willingness to 
45. See text at note 49 infra. 
46. D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 97 (1957); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 
480-83 (8th ed. 1970). 
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cooperate by maintaining that high price . .lfthe two firms could coop-
erate in pricing at this high level, then they could divide the monopoly 
profit that this market offers them. Assume that the alternative to this 
high cooperative monopoly price is a lower price - like that produced 
by competition. Competition is costly for the duopolists; its dollar 
cost is measured precisely by monopoly profits the two forgo. 
Because the Sherman Act outlaws contractual price cooperation 
between firms, the two must decide in every time period what price 
level to choose. If this pricing game occurs only once (for instance, a 
sealed bid for a huge one-time Pentagon soft drink supply contract) 
then the classical logic of the one-time prisoner's dilemma game gov-
erns: both Coke and Pepsi, if rational, will opt for the low non-
cooperative price. Even though both would benefit from high 
cooperative prices, the reward for noncooperative behavior (together 
with mutual fear that the other firm will selfishly exploit any coopera-
tive overtures) dooms attractive producer cooperation and assures 
consumers of the benefits of low competitive prices. In the one-shot 
game, noncooperation (or competitive pricing, in the cartel context) is 
a dominant strategy - a strong conclusion denoting that "picking the 
low price is the best strategy no matter what the other player does. If 
the prisoner's dilemma is repeated a finite number of times, noncoop-
eration is not a dominant strategy - but neither is anything else. We 
thus must employ other and less robust solution concepts to define the 
game's "result." The conventional alternative is the Nash equilibrium, 
which defines a set of strategies such that no one player, regarding 
others as committed to their choices, can improve its fortunes.47 A 
Nash (or any other) equilibrium is said to be perfect if the players' 
threats that support it are credible.48 In the finitely repeated prisoner's 
dilemma, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium is the noncooperative 
strategy of "cheating" or "finking" on each move.49 This analysis thus 
suggests that, over time, both firms will repeat the one-shot result of 
charging low prices. 
This result is striking for antitrust analysts. Even for the most 
concentrated oligopoly conceivable, this conclusion directly contra-
47. Nash, Non-cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951). 
48. Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive 
Games, 4 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 25 (1975). 
49. E. RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (forthcoming). 
My discussion deals only with theoretical analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The empirical 
work on the topic is vast, highly suggestive, and beyond my present focus. An extremely helpful 
survey can be found in Roth, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Over-
view, EcoN. J. (forthcoming, Dec. 1988); see also Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & Van de Kragt, 
Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egoistic Incentives, (manuscript on file at 
Michigan Law Review). 
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diets the Court's unrestrained confidence in American Column that 
data exchanges ought to be illegal because it is so easy to persuade 
competitors - even in large numbers - to do "that which will obvi-
ously prove profitable."50 The dilemma of the situation is that cooper-
ation can elude even those who are desperately aware of its allure. 
The implications for merger law are equally subversive. This game 
theory suggests that law could permit firms to merge until only two 
remained in the market. As long as contracts to fix prices remained 
unenforceable, the game's logic suggests that even this highly concen-
trated duopoly would encounter the same inability to achieve high co-
operative prices. This implication suggests that when the Department 
of Justice rejected earlier law in 1984, its revisionism did not go far 
enough. 
I certainly do not claim that, without the prisoner's dilemma, in-
dustrial organization scholars had no clue that cartel efforts were 
prone to a cheating incentive. Unlike antitrust judges, economists' 
skepticism about cooperation has been long-standing and widespread. 
For instance, a recent economic analysis of OPEC concluded that 
OPEC is exactly what it appears to be: a cartel that has lasted quite a 
while.51 This news would scarcely be noteworthy were it not for the 
prevalent belief among economists that successful and prolonged co-
operation is virtually impossible. 52 Indeed, this disbelief in the threat 
of successful cooperation sometimes waxes so confident as to prompt 
calls from economic scholars to repeal the Sherman Act altogether. 53 
None of these attitudes hangs or falls on the outcome of research on 
the prisoner's dilemma. The most I can assert is that analysis of the 
prisoner's dilemma has supported - not caused - skepticism about 
the harmful consequences of reciprocity. 
Yet, analysis of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma concisely 
and compellingly formulates criticism of antitrust doctrine's confi-
dence that "tacit collusion is likely": it is a non sequitur to reason that 
individuals within a group necessarily will do what is in their group's 
self-interest. Indeed, the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma puts the 
shoe on the other foot. It suggests that tacit group cooperation may be 
the exception, not the rule, even in the smallest of groups. 
50. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 407 (1921). See note 17 
supra and accompanying text. 
51. Griffin, OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses, 15 AM. EcoN. REV. 954 
(1985). 
52. See, e.g., Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcoN. J. 41, 48 (1929) ("understandings 
between competitors are notoriously fragile"). 
53. D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986); Smith, Why Not 
Abolish Antitrust?, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 23. 
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It is ironic, however, that the game theorists who had used the 
prisoner's dilemma to establish the logical case against cooperation 
were not delighted with their result. For instance, Shubik described 
the noncooperative equilibrium of a finitely repeated prisoner's di-
lemma as "logical and silly,"54 while Selten accepted the "logical va-
lidity" of this noncooperative equilibrium but rejected it "as a guide to 
practical behavior."55 Theorists continued to labor on a "solution" to 
the prisoner's dilemma - thus suggesting that they thought have reci-
procity was more likely in the real world than their model has implied. 
These theorists have succeeded in specifying a variety of game con-
ditions that might support cooperation as an equilibrium strategy to 
the repeated prisoner's dilemma: infinite repetition of the game with-
out too much discounting;56 potentially infinite repetition with an ex-
ogenous and known probability that the repetition will terminate after 
any given round;57 finite repetition in which the players do not know 
how many rounds remain;58 finite repetition between players who have 
a small but positive likelihood of being "crazy" or irrationally cooper-
ative;59 and construction of a metagame in which players choose con-
ditional strategies that can depend upon the choices made by the other 
player. 60 These efforts showed that the logic of noncooperation was 
not ineluctable. 
These analyses failed, however, to marshal a case that cooperation 
is more likely than competition. I summarize the objections seriatim. 
All approaches relying upon infinite repetition are vulnerable to the 
indeterminacy of the Folk Theorem, which specifies that eternal coop-
eration is a perfect Nash outcome - but so is a great variety of other 
54. Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solu-
tions, 14 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 181, 184 (1970). 
55. Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 133 (1978). See also D. 
LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 46, at 101. (The non-cooperative equilibrium "is not reasonable 
in the sense that we predict most intelligent people would not play accordingly .... We feel that 
in most cases an unarticulated collusion between the players will develop, much in the same way 
as a mature economic market often exhibits a marked degree of collusion without any communi-
cation among the participants.") 
This theoretical disquiet turns out to have some empirical basis. See cases cited in note 49 
supra. 
56. Rubinstein, Strong Pelfect Equilibrium in Supergames, 9 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 1 
(1980). See also D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 46, at 102 (infinite solution is "[i]ntuitively 
... plausible"). 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts & Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Pris-
oners' Dilemma, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 245 (1982). 
60. N. HOWARD, PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLIT-
ICAL BEHAVIOR (1971); Howard, The Theory of Meta-games, 12 GEN. SYS. 167 (1966). 
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patterns of action, including competition. 61 The assumption that, with 
some probability, the prisoner's dilemma will end in any given round, 
presents the same difficulty. A different version of the Folk Theorem 
establishes that models using "crazy" players can generate an array of 
equilibria simply by varying assumptions about the type of irrational 
behavior. 62 Finally, the metagame approach does not fill the gap; 
some criticize its general utility, 63 while even its supporters concede 
that it "still needs to be translated in a social context."64 
For the antitrust context, then, this research implicitly acknowl-
edged the possibility of tacit cartel collusion but was - at very best -
agnostic about the extent of its threat. Then came Axelrod. 
C. Axe/rod's Analysis of the Evolution of Cooperation: The Success 
of Tit-for-Tat 
In the last decade, Axelrod's works have been hugely influential 
because they make a stronger prediction: that cooperation is likely to 
evolve between self-interested players in a repeated prisoner's di-
lemma. 65 Axelrod based this prediction on the striking success of a 
particular strategy for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: Tit-for-Tat. 
This strategy plays the prisoner's dilemma game by cooperating on the 
game's first move, and then, on following turns, playing the same 
move as its opponent played on the just-finished round. This strategy 
is cooperative in three senses: it is "nice"66 (because it initially tries to 
cooperate); it is "retaliatory"67 (because it quickly punishes opponents 
who cheat by lowering price); and it is "forgiving"68 (because it 
quickly returns to cooperation after the other player renews efforts to 
cooperate). Tit-for-Tat independently formalized a notion of coopera-
tion enforcement that economists outside game theory long have de-
scribed as "detecting significant deviations from the agreed-upon 
61. E. Rasmusen, A New Version of the Folk Theorem: (June 28, 1988) (Anderson Graduate 
School of Management UCLA, Business Economics Working Paper No. 87-6). 
62. Fudenberg & Mask.in, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with 
Incomplete Information, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 533 (1986). 
63. M. SHUBIK, supra note 43, at 328-31; Shubik, supra note 54, at 190. 
64. Rapoport, Escape from Paradox, 217 Sci. AM. 50, 56 (1967). 
65. R. AxELROD, supra note l; Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. PoL. 
SCI. REV. 1095 (1986) [hereinafter Axelrod, Evolutionary Approach]; Axelrod, The Emergence of 
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 306 (1981); Axelrod, More Effective Choice 
in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT REsoLUTION 379 (1980); Axelrod & Hamilton, The 
Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390 (1981); see also Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT REsoLUTION 3 (1980). Axelrod and Dion's Annotated Bibliography 
on The Evolution of Cooperation (unpublished manuscript Sept. 1987) contained 236 references. 
66. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 33. 
67. Id. at 44. 
68. Id. at 36. 
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prices [that] ... will be matched by fellow conspirators if they are not 
withdrawn. "69 
Axelrod had the brilliant idea of analyzing the repeated prisoner's 
dilemma game by experimenting in a tournament format, with real 
people submitting different candidate strategies that Axelrod then 
paired off against each other. The tournament idea, like many great 
ones, seems simple in retrospect. Here is how it worked. Consider the 
following prisoner's dilemma matrix, which Axelrod used and which 
is similar to the one discussed above70 (except that numbers are 
switched from representing an undesirable quantity, like jail time, to 
representing desirable goods, like dollars or winning points). 
COLUMN PLAYER 
cooperate defect 
p 
R L cooperate (3,3) (0,5) 
0 A 
w y 
E defect (5,0) (1,1) 
R 
Parentheses: (points for ROW, points for COLUMN) 
Had you responded to Axelrod's invitation to play in his first 
tournament (an invitation that fifteen game theory types in fact 
accepted), you would have submitted your pick of a strategy for 
playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma. For example, one such 
strategy is "always cooperate." The tit-for-tat submission was 
"cooperate in the first round, and thereafter copy the opponent's last 
move." The variety of conceivable strategies is infinite. Axelrod 
pitted each of the fifteen strategies submitted against every other for 
200 rounds. (For instance, the match of "always cooperate" against 
"always defect" simply adds up the scores in the northeast cell 200 
times. "Always cooperate" thus scores 0 and "always defect" scores 
1000 for this match.) Axelrod then totaled the points that each 
strategy won in every match and compared the overall results. 
Axelrod conducted three variations of this basic tournament. In 
the second tournament, he publicized his results, enlisted 63 instead of 
15 players, and ran each match for a probabilistic number of rounds 
with a mean of 151 (rather than the determinant 200 rounds). In a 
third type of test, Axelrod altered the proportions of representative 
strategies in six different ways and reran the second tournament six 
69. Stigler, supra note 32, at 46. 
70. See matrix at text following note 44 supra. 
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times to determine how robust winning strategies were. Fourth, 
Axelrod ran the strategies from the second tournament in an 
"ecological" environment: after playing each strategy against every 
other strategy one time, for the next round Axelrod changed a 
strategy's representation in the total population to reflect that 
strategy's average score in the previous round. Axelrod continued this 
process for 1000 "generations." 
Tit-for-Tat was spectacularly successful. Its total score beat all 
other strategies' total scores in the first two tournaments. In the third 
tournament - the set of six tests - Tit-for-Tat placed first in all but 
one test, where it placed second. And in the fourth "ecological'' test, 
Tit-for-Tat's total score was highest in the first round. Thereafter Tit-
for-Tat never relinquished this lead and by the lOOOth generation was 
the most successful and fastest-growing rule. 
These results seem sensational for antitrust. Axelrod's 
tournaments seemed to offer, for the first time, a precise account of 
whether - and why - the threat of producer reciprocity among, 
profit maximizers is grave. Skeptics had scoffed that retaliation was 
unlikely to lead to reciprocity between competitors because retaliation 
would decrease profits and hence would be "as irrational and as 
unlikely as predatory pricing."71 The key implication of Axelrod's 
work responded that short-run and long-run rationality differed 
radically - with cooperation supplanting the logic of competition in 
the long run. The reaction in legal literature was predictable: a 
commentator announced that Axelrod's analysis suggested that "the 
inevitability of competition within oligopolies and contract-rigging 
consortiums may be only myths."72 It seemed as though Axelrod's 
work had vindicated tum-of-the-century judges against those judges' 
modem critics. 
As the commentator recognized, however, scholarly analysis of 
reciprocity is still in its infancy. Axelrod was willing to extend his 
conclusion to situations - Congress, war, and international relations 
- that imply his results are widely applicable. Yet Axelrod's analysis 
differs in many respects from the market problem that is the concern 
of antitrust. 
71. Y. BROZEN, supra note 41, at 136 (footnote omitted). See generally notes 32-41 supra 
and accompanying text. 
72. Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation (Book Review), 93 
YALE L.J. 1147, 1157 (1984) (reviewing R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984)). 
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D. Three Limits on Axe/rod's Antitrust Relevance 
The promise of Axelrod's work for antitrust law has yet to be real-
ized. Like any model, Axelrod's tournament research abstracts a great 
deal from reality. These abstractions are points of practical frailty. 
The binary character of choice in the prisoner's dilemma, for instance, 
is a great simplification of real market environments. Firms normally 
face an infinite array of competitive choices, on quality as well as price 
attributes - and for a line of products, not just one. They can, in 
other words, cheat on a cooperative arrangement a lot, a little, or not 
at all - and in many different ways. But the binary limitation of Ax-
elrod's tournaments is not necessarily a simplification that is mislead-
ing. Preliminary work by Bendor suggests that replacing a binary 
choice with a prisoner's dilemma game offering continuous (but 
bounded) choices produces results analogous to the binary game. 73 
In a similar vein, Axelrod also employs an equilibrium concept of 
collective stability. Boyd and Lorberbaum show that this solution 
concept need not imply evolutionary stability.74 Although any model 
aimed at antitrust relevance would have to make explicit and defend 
its choice of equilibrium concept, this point does not necessarily cast 
doubt on the general character of Axelrod's results. 
Three other general factors; however, do qualify heavily the pres-
ent applicability of Axelrod's work to antitrust law. My point here, of 
course, is not to scold Axelrod for shortsightedness. His pathbreaking 
effort had a far more general aim than investigation of proper policy 
for the Sherman Act. Rather my concern is to sketch the further work 
that is needed before Axelrod's insights can be transferred to the mar-
ket context with confidence. 
1. Number and Size of Players 
Axelrod's tournaments involve many competing strategies that in-
teract with others, one at a time. A model of repeated encounters be-
tween pairs makes sense for many applications, for instance, a wolf 
and a bear competing for caribou carcasses. In the market context, 
however, competition between pairs occurs only in rare cases of duop-
oly. Usually more than two firms populate a market. Observations by 
scholars outside the field of antitrust, 75 as well as more recent com-
73. Bendor, In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
531 (1987). 
74. Boyd & Lorberbaum, No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's 
Dilemma Game, 327 NATURE 58 (1987). 
75. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 43 (1982); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
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men ts by Axelrod, 76 suggest that coordination becomes more difficult 
as the number of players increases. 
In fact, it has been a long-standing theme of the industrial organi-
zation literature that cartelizing grows more difficult as the number of 
firms in the market increases.77 Indeed, this notion forms the very 
premise of our merger law, which makes measures of industrial con-
centration the key determinant of merger legality. Axelrod's tourna-
ment approach thus does not model antitrust's crucial question about 
reciprocity: How many firms does it take to make the prospect of co-
operative pricing unlikely? 
Recent analysis in Axelrod's tradition by Boyd and Richerson 
stresses the importance of studying the likelihood of reciprocity in siz-
able groups. These authors show that the likelihood that Tit-for-Tat 
will become common at a stable equilibrium diminishes rapidly as the 
number of players increases. 78 Boyd and Richerson make no effort to 
adapt their model to a market context. But their preliminary and 
qualitative findings are consistent with economists' standard intuition 
that collusion is difficult in a crowd. These insights suggest that an 
Axelrodian fear of collusion may be limited to duopolies and similarly 
extreme - and highly unusual - levels of market concentration. 
The general idea that collusion is harder in sizable groups suggests 
a related point. Conventional antitrust wisdom holds that successful 
collusion produces supercompetitive returns, attracts entry, and thus 
exacerbates the coordination problem. At the same time, the new en-
try diminishes all players' relative returns from cooperating rather 
than cheating. Axelrod's analysis does not model these entry effects. 
Because entry is the nemesis of long-run cartel success, this omission 
may be an additional reason why future work in the spirit of Axelrod 
may fail to support the prospect of viable long-run producer 
reciprocity. 
Finally, Axelrod uses a payoff matrix that presumes that players 
have an equal ability to injure each other. Axelrod used a prisoner's 
dilemma with a temptation of 5, reward for mutual cooperation of 3, 
and a sucker's payoff of 0. 79 These values were the same for both play-
ers. In the market context, we might interpret this feature as an as-
NATIONS 29-34 (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 36 (1971); M. TAYLOR, 
COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 53 (1982). 
76. See Axelrod, Evolutionary Approach, supra note 65, at 1100. 
77. E.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
199 (2d ed. 1980). 
78. Boyd & Richerson, supra note 44. 
79. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 8. See note 44 and text at note 70 supra. 
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sumption that all players are of equal size, or that relative size is 
irrelevant to the game's outcome. Yet conventional antitrust wisdom 
asserts that the relative size of firms does matter. If Pepsi and Coke 
merge to leave only tiny Shasta Cola, for instance, the standard atti-
tude is that cooperation is more likely than if Coke has one half of the 
market and Pepsi the other. Axelrod's analysis cannot inform us if 
this conventional analysis is correct, backwards, or completely irrele-
vant, because his tournaments took no account of varying player size. 
2. Certainty 
Axelrod's tournaments assumed that pairs of players understand 
each others' moves perfectly. Firms, however, can err in interpreting 
each others' market responses. A firm would commit a Type I error 
by believing incorrectly that a rival had cut prices, and a Type II error 
by failing to detect a rival's price cutting. so Examples of Type I errors 
would arise if a cartel member believes a customer's lie (motivated by 
the customer's effort to induce price cutting) that another cartel firm 
cheated by cutting prices. Or suppose Saudi Arabia intends to limit its 
output to quota levels, but simply makes an accounting error that 
yields a larger output in some period. Or imagine Venezuela wants to 
follow OPEC's price, but inadvertently provides a customer with an 
added service that other OPEC players interpret to be quality competi-
tion. Type II errors, on the other hand, follow from the fact that 
"[t]he detection of secret price-cutting will of course be as difficult as 
interested people can make it."81 
Axelrod's tournaments cannot say whether "noisy" communica-
tion is a serious barrier to cooperation, because they implicitly as-
sumed that one player could identify the other's move with perfect 
certainty. Omitting treatment of uncertainty is a particularly signifi-
cant weakness for antitrust law governing data exchanges and merg-
ers. In these contexts, uncertainty about others' actions is highly 
likely. Firms in these situations typically are anxious to conceal or 
disguise noncooperative cheating, thus prompting Type II errors. 
Conversely firms wish to correct others' Type I misperceptions, but 
antitrust law's per se rule against price fixing makes this type of com-
municating extremely hazardous. 
Several recent papers suggest that players' uncertainty about other 
players' moves can alter dramatically the prospects for Tit-for-Tat's 
success. Hirshleifer and Martinez Coll use a very simple model to an-
80. McKinnon, Stigler's Theory of Oligopoly: A Comment, 74 J. PoL. EcoN. 281, 281 (1966). 
81. Stigler, supra note 32, at 47. 
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alyze Tit-for-Tat's stability under conditions of uncertainty. The pos-
sibility that players might misinterpret the other's moves, these 
authors find, can lead either to a cooperative or to a competitive equi-
librium - depending on initial mix of strategies in the population. 82 
Similarly, Bendor concludes that small levels of uncertainty cause 
Tit-for-Tat to behave quite differently than it did in Axelrod's tourna-
ments. 83 Bendor finds that two Tit-for-Tat players cannot sustain a 
high level of cooperation when playing under such conditions. In the 
generational or "ecological" setting, Tit-for-Tat's instability .creates an 
opportunity for strategies with longer memories, which in turn can 
attract exploiting competitive strategies. Bendor and Mookherjee also 
find that very small errors of perception or external uncertainty can 
alter dramatically the successful cooperation that can occur in a de-
centralized reciprocal relationship operating under complete cer-
tainty. 84 These works suggest that imperfect communication can 
make successful cooperation far less of an antitrust threat than Axel-
rod's tournament results might imply. 
3. The Market Interpretation of a Tournament: How Do Firms 
Learn? 
It is difficult to interpret the first three of Axelrod's tournaments in 
an antitrust context. Most literally, the analogy suggests an economy 
that contains as many competing firms as Axelrod's tournaments con-
tained competing strategies: 15 or 63. Each firm competes with all 
others, but only one at a time - presumably by entering one product 
or geographical market for 150-200 pricing periods, withdrawing, en-
tering another product or geographical market, and so on. When the 
rounds are completed, the firms total their profits and the richest one 
"wins." This tournament model is poorly adapted to the antitrust 
context. We never see firms engage in dilettantism of such widespread 
and short-lived proportions. 
Axelrod suggests that his fourth test - the generational or "eco-
logical" tournament - is better tailored to a market analogy: "a rule 
which was not scoring well might be less likely to appear in the future 
for several different reasons. One possibility is . . . a person using a 
rule sees that other strategies are more successful and therefore 
82. Hirshleifer & Martinez Coll, What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of 
Cooperation?, J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION (forthcoming). 
83. Bendor, supra note 73, at 544-45. 
84. Bendor & Mookherjee, Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action, 
81 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 129 (1987). See also Milgrom, Axe/rods The Evolution of Cooperation, 
15 RAND J. ECON. 305, 308 (1984) ("The possibility of misinterpretation has significant effects 
on the desirability of a TIT-FOR-TAT strategy."). 
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switches to one of those strategies."85 By conceiving of managers who 
learn from others' experience in distant markets, Axelrod can avoid 
the implausible need for an individual firm itself to enter and exit a 
large number of markets. 
Models of cultural transmission, however, depend crucially on the 
details. 86 Axelrod's model assumes that, from one period to another, 
strategies gather adherents among managers or firms in proportion to 
each strategy's "success." But Axelrod defines success in a particular 
and important way: the size of the total points won from interacting 
with all players. 87 Put otherwise, Axelrod defines the most successful 
strategy to be the one with the largest average point score. Tit-for-Tat 
never defeats a rival in any one particular match. It cannot. But it 
does well overall because it stimulates high-scoring cooperation with a 
wide range of partners. 
It is quite possible to define "success" differently. UCLA fans 
might say a football season that includes a victory in the USC game is 
more successful than a season that produces a higher-scoring point 
average against all rivals but includes a loss to USC. Similarly, the 
management philosophy of A vis might focus more on outselling Hertz 
than on producing a high level of profit compared to the Fortune 500. 
Similarly, Avis might consider its showing against Hertz to be a more 
significant and reliable performance indicator than comparisons with 
dissimilar firms in unrelated markets, where factors besides manage-
ment skill complicate the comparison. 
In terms of game theory, there is a dramatic difference between 
setting a goal of victory or one of high payoff. 88 Stated in a second and 
equivalent way, defining "success" in relative local terms can lead to 
far different results than defining success in absolute or global average 
terms.89 Tit-for-Tat performs well under conditions that stress abso-
lute payoff success but does very poorly when success and propagation 
depend rather upon relative victories. Stated in yet a third way, Axel-
rod finds that a round-robin tournament favors cooperation - but co-
operation is either stymied or eliminated altogether if the tournament 
85. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 50. 
86. R. BOYD & P. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS passim 
(1985). Cf. Milgrom, supra note 84, at 308 ("[T]here is still the problem of identifying who the 
players in the game are .... Whenever anyone plays a game as part of a family, a firm, or any 
other organization, there are always the questions of who the players are and to whom reputa-
tions attach."). 
87. R. AXELROD, supra note 1. 
88. Behr, Nice Guys Finish Last-Sometimes, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 289 (1981). 
89. See Boyd, Density-Dependent Mortality and the Evolution of Social Interactions, 30 
ANIMAL BEHAV. 972 (1982). 
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is an elimination bout in which the winning player survives and the 
loser disappears. 90 
Once again, Axelrod's results will require heavy qualification 
before they can be applied to the antitrust context. One economic tra-
dition prefers to model firm managers as relentless profit maximizers 
who work to maximize shareholders' wealth, without regard to per-
sonal managerial goals like prestige, total corporate size, or machismo. 
This tradition suggests that firm managers in fact might survey the 
interactions of firms throughout the economy and adopt for them-
selves the strategy that produces the highest profit, on average, thus 
supporting Axelrod's round-robin assumption and its cooperative re-
sult. But another tradition stresses that optimization may result pri-
marily because efficient firms avoid competitive elimination.91 If that 
is the case, then the best model of strategy transmission may concen-
trate on a model of elimination bouts - thus suggesting that coopera-
tion is highly unlikely to arise and that competition should flourish. 
Once again, Axelrod's tournament results would imply results oppo-
site to those most relevant for antitrust law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The two doctrines I have examined are important antitrust policy. 
The law of data exchanges governs every market in the country, estab-
lishing what communication among competitors is permitted and 
what is forbidden. Mergers today often involve millions, if not bil-
lions, of dollars. Yet over time the law that governs these everyday 
economic transactions has made widely differing assumptions about 
the vulnerability of competition to successful producer reciprocity. 
These assumptions have been rooted in the merest conjecture about 
the viability of harmful producer reciprocity. As thus should be ex-
pected, they have proven vulnerable to substantial revision with shift-
ing political tides. There has been recent progress on a stouter theory 
of reciprocity, but that progress should impress antitrust with its po-
tential for - not its current offering of - useful insight. Until that 
theory can give judges helpful generalizations about when cooperation 
is more likely than competition, antitrust will continue to be based 
only on the current fashion in guesswork. 
90. Hirshleifer & Martinez Coll, supra note 82. See also R. SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OP 
RIGHTS, Co-OPERATION AND WELFARE 121 (1986). 
91. See Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950). 
